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Abstract 
This paper studies the relationship between Greek capitalism and the European Union in 
the light of the recent developments (i.e. the current global crisis and the fiscal and debt crisis of 
Greece). The first part analyses the turbulent historical course of Greek capitalism and its passage 
from phases of development to crises and waves of capitalist restructuring. In particular, it 
pinpoints its status as a second-generation middle-range capitalism with limited imperialist 
abilities. The second part analyses the position of Greek capitalism within the European 
imperialist bloc and the advantages but also the dangers stemming from its participation in it. It 
focuses especially on the waves of capitalist restructuring inaugurated after the 1973 crisis and 
their concomitant results and problems. The third part focuses on the current global crisis and how 
it has been expressed in Greece. It is depicted as a twin crisis, i.e. a combination of (a) the current 
global crisis (a crisis of overaccumulation of capital caused by the falling tendency of the rate of 
profit), with (b) particular Greek structural problems (most of them derived from its participation 
in the European imperialist bloc). The last part concludes with the proposal for a radical 
alternative to the policies of the EU and the Greek bourgeoisie. The main pillar of this proposal is 
the disengagement from the European imperialist integration process and the radical restructuring 
of the Greek economy towards a process of socialist transition. 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Today Greece has caught international attention as one of the significant 
culprits of global economic fragility. In particular, it is being depicted as a profligate 
economy riddled with corruption which had collectively exploited European 
benevolence through the extensive use of ‘Greek statistics’. Therefore, it represents a 
time bomb (together with several other similar culprits collectively ridiculed as PIGS) 
at the very foundations of the European integration project in the midst of the hard 
times of a global crisis. Thus Greece is scapegoated as EU’s ‘black ship’ and is 
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exemplary disciplined – for its own salvation - through the harsh provisions of the 
EU-IMF Memorandum. As it is typical in mainstream mantras, whatever the problem 
it is being depicted as the outcome of erroneous policies and not as a structural 
systemic problem. Then a scapegoat is necessary to be blamed (and thus hide the 
deeper causes) and its exemplary punishment is used also as an example for others 
prone to same excesses. 
Contrary to this mainstream mantra, the true story is quite different. 
Capitalism is passing through the first great depression of the 21st century (Shaikh 
(2011)) which impacts gravely upon its international architecture affecting all its main 
international poles (North America, Pacific Basin, Europe etc.) both internally and in 
their interrelationships. The Greek (and more broadly the PIGS) problem is part of 
this process and particularly the way global crisis impacts upon the long and 
strenuous march towards the creation of a European imperialist block. Hence, the 
Greek and PIGS problem has much deeper causes laying at the organic contradictions 
of the capitalist system and the structural problems of one of its main international 
poles, the EU. 
This paper argues that Greek capitalism’s current crisis is a twin crisis: the 
combination of the current global crisis with the particular Greek structural problems. 
On the one hand, it is the outcome of the general tendencies and contradictions 
of the capitalist system and in particular of its current global crisis. Contrary to both 
mainstream (subprime crisis) and certain radical (financialisation crisis) explanations, 
this is not a financial crisis but a fully blown crisis of the very essence of the capitalist 
system, the productive economy. Specifically, it is a crisis a-la-Marx, i.e. a crisis 
stemming from the tendency of the rate of profit to fall. Moreover, the current crisis is 
a continuation of the ‘silent depression’ that followed the crisis of 1973-75. The latter 
was a structural crisis, i.e. it reflected the exhaustion of the previous socio-economic 
architecture of the system and pressed for the creation of a novel, more functional 
one. As such, it led to several waves of capitalist restructuring searching for this 
successor. These capitalist restructuring waves managed to alleviate part of the drop 
in capitalist profitability and to restore to a certain extent capitalist accumulation 
particularly by increasing drastically labour’s exploitation and by recoursing, at a 
latter stage, to fictitious capital expansion. However, they have failed, till today, to 
solve the longer long-run problem, i.e. to find a functional and long-viable new 
systemic architecture. The current crisis is the result of this inability. One of the 
consequences of the crisis is that it violates long-standing balances of power in the 
global imperialist pyramid by providing chances for other capitalisms to be upgraded 
and other to be downgraded. Part of this game is that the winners pass part of their 
crisis burdens to the losers. Greek capitalism followed these general tendencies 
closely and with diminishing time-lags. Hence, its crisis is the expression of these 
immanent contradictions. 
On the other hand, Greek capitalism’s crisis is also the result of its particular 
structural problems as they were shaped and aggravated by its incorporation in the 
European imperialist bloc. This incorporation is a bet placed by the Greek bourgeoisie 
promising gains but also fraught with dangers. It upgraded Greek capitalism from a 
second-generation middle-range capitalism with limited imperialist abilities to a 
‘partner’ in a first-class imperialist block with enhanced possibilities (particularly in 
the Balkan and Mediterranean area). But, also, dictated changes that dissolved its 
previous productive model without replacing it with another equally coherent. 
Furthermore, while enhancing Greek capital’s clout mainly vis-à-vis other non-EU 
capitals it had reduced it vis-à-vis the ‘hard core’ of the EU (i.e. the more developed 
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Western European economies). This dissolution of a coherent productive model (as 
well as the delegation of crucial economic policies to Brussels) – and not the 
supposed excessive wage increases as is usually preached - is the cause of the rapid 
erosion of Greek competitiveness vis-à-vis this ‘hard core’. Again, contrary again to 
the mainstream (and some also radical) mantras, the working class has paid dearly for 
both the gains and the losses of Greek capital’s incorporation in the EU. But the 
current crisis brings all the contradictions to the fore: both the dominant and the 
subaltern classes have to calculate their gains and losses particularly in the face of the 
grave pains and the far-reaching structural changes that the EU-IMF Memorandum 
dictates. 
The paper is structured as follows. The next section analyses the turbulent 
historical course of Greek capitalism and its passage from phases of development to 
crises and waves of capitalist restructuring. In particular, it pinpoints its status as a 
second-generation middle-range capitalism with limited imperialist abilities. The third 
section analyses the position of Greek capitalism within the European imperialist bloc 
and the advantages but also the dangers stemming from its participation in it. It 
focuses especially on the waves of capitalist restructuring inaugurated after the 1973 
crisis and their concomitant results and problems. The fourth section focuses on the 
current global crisis and how it has been expressed in Greece. It is depicted as a twin 
crisis, i.e. a combination of (a) the current global crisis (a crisis of overaccumulation 
of capital caused by the falling tendency of the rate of profit), with (b) particular 
Greek structural problems (most of them derived from its participation in the 
European imperialist bloc). The last section concludes with the proposal for a radical 
alternative to the policies of the EU and the Greek bourgeoisie. The main pillar of this 
proposal is the disengagement from the European imperialist integration process and 
the radical restructuring of the Greek economy towards a process of socialist 
transition. 
 
 
 
II. The turbulent course of Greek capitalism: development, crisis and 
restructuring 
 
II.1 Greek capitalism in the international division of labour 
 
Greek capitalism is a second-generation middle-range capitalism with limited 
imperialist abilities. It is a second-generation capitalism because it does not belong to 
the group of countries (Western Europe and Japan) where capitalism was firstly 
inaugurated and was already established in the 16th century. Although pre-capitalist 
relations were born much earlier in the region of Greece, a number of crucial factors 
(the type of socio-economic relations in the Byzantine and the Ottoman empires, the 
lack of a national basis etc.) hindered considerably their development. On the other 
hand, Greek capitalism is not a newcomer. Capitalist relations have appeared in 
Greece from the middle of the 17th century. Furthermore, Greece’s proximity to the 
first centres of capitalist development opened it to crucial influences and close 
relations, particularly through the Greek diaspora which held significant economic 
positions in several of these more developed countries. This was reinforced from the 
fact that Greeks merchants, proto-capitalists and later capitalists held important 
economic positions within the Ottoman economy particularly from the time that the 
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latter’s economic centres moved to the Mediterranean area and centred upon relations 
with the more developed West. 
Thus, Greek capitalism may be a second-generation capitalism but even from 
its birth had sectors that were internationalised and/or inordinately developed 
compared to its status. This equipped it with strong expansionary tendencies, given 
the small size of the Greek economy; particularly during the first steps of the Greek 
state. These expansionary tendencies of Greek capitals – fed by their inherited 
positions in the surrounding area and constrained by the small size of their national 
basis – engrafted Greek capitalism with imperialist tendencies from its very 
beginning. However, these imperialist tendencies were inherently unstable and weak 
because of the lack of a strong national arm. They took the form of periodic forays to 
other areas which had mid-term results but not usually longevity. 
In Ioannides - Mavroudeas (2000) we have recognized the following sub-
periods of Greek capitalist development: 
(1) During the 1830-70 sub-period capitalist relations were consolidated and 
the signs of a first anemic development appeared. The first post-liberation economic 
activities centered mainly on agriculture, commerce and shipping. Industrialization 
was very limited and concerned basically processing of agricultural products (winery, 
soap-making, tannage etc.). Active industrial policies were absent and the economy 
was export-orientated since a sufficiently developed internal market did not exist. 
Certain typically exportable agricultural products (tobacco, raisin etc.) constituted the 
backbone of this orientation towards exports. Although elements and relations of the 
stage of laissez-faire capitalism predominated during all that sub-period, they co-
existed with suis generis and improvising policies that attempted to boost capitalist 
development. 
(2) Important transformations accomplished during the 1870-80 sub-period 
strengthened the capitalist relations and led to a first phase of rapid development. The 
Trikoupi government policies bolstered systematically big capital and provided the 
necessary infrastructure for capitalist accumulation. At the same time, and despite the 
verbal adherence to liberal principles, elements of the monopolist stage (especially 
protectionist and interventionist regulations) were introduced because they were 
necessitated both by Greek peculiarities and general trends of the international 
economy. 
(3) During the war sub-period (1880-1920) Greek capitalism achieved a high 
performance because of the demand created by the war effort but also the territorial 
expansion of the Greek state, which provided a wider vital space for capitalist 
accumulation. 
(4) The 1920-30 sub-period was characterized by intensive restructuring and a 
second phase of rapid development. At the same time there was a significant increase 
of state interventionism and protectionist policies that led to the predominance of 
processes and features belonging to the monopoly stage. 
(5) The 1930-1944 sub-period was, in a sense, a continuation of the previous 
one. However, W.W.II caused a significant disruption of the relations of capitalist 
reproduction for both internal and external reasons. 
(6) During the 1944-50 sub-period the post-war reconstruction of capitalist 
relations was accomplished and were laid the foundations for the restructuring of the 
next sub-period. 
(7) The 1950-60 sub-period was characterized by changes towards the state-
monopolist phase of monopoly capitalism and prepared the ground for the next era of 
intensive development. 
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(8) The ‘golden era’ of Greek capitalism (1960-73) was characterized by 
extremely high rates of capitalist accumulation and profitability. It was characterized 
by state-monopolist relations mainly. One important Greek peculiarity was the lack of 
a developed welfare system. Instead of that a number of suis generis Greek solutions 
were implemented (e.g. giving land in exchange for apartments) in order to create a 
large and at the same time cheap workforce and also a large middle class. During that 
sub-period manufacture became the bigger sector of the economy. 
(9) The1973-today sub-period is marked by the 1973 crisis and the subsequent 
restructurings. From that era and onwards the time-lags of Greek capitalism have been 
more or less eliminated. Another feature of this sub-period is that services surpassed 
manufacture as the bigger sector of the economy while agriculture continued its 
decline. 
 
 
II.2 The 1973 structural crisis and the waves of capitalist restructuring 
 
The 1973-5 crisis is the third global crisis of capitalism (after those of 1873 
and 1929). It has been substantiated in the Marxist Political Economy literature that 
this was a crisis of overaccumulation of capital caused by a falling profit rate due to 
the increase of the organic composition of capital, i.e. was a typical crisis a-la-Marx 
(Shaikh & Tonak (1994), Dumenil & Levy (1993) etc.). This crisis ended 20th 
century’s ‘golden age of smooth and robust capitalist reproduction and ushered the 
system in a long period of anaemic growth. Because of these features, t is 
characterised as a structural crisis and not a usual mid-term cyclical crisis. As such it 
belongs to the crises that mark the end of a long-wave of capitalist development and 
pose the necessity of a radical overhauling of the architecture of the system. That is, it 
necessitates far-reaching changes in all the main fields of capitalist reproduction, from 
its labour and production process till its political and institutional framework. 
This search for a new configuration does not follow given patterns and 
solutions but is experimental and heuristic. Old solutions are exhausted and new 
problems require novel answers. Thus, the system enters a long period of 
experimentation and instability. Solutions are not obvious and have to be invented 
through trial and error, the unity of the capitalist class behind a proposed solution is 
not pre-given (since it affects relations and power balances between sections of 
capital) and, last but not the least, the willing or not acquiescence of the working class 
is far from secured. Hence, during the aftermaths of structural crises the system enters 
long periods characterised by successive policy and structural experiments, i.e. waves 
of capitalist restructuring. Two are the main objectives of these waves: 
(1) the recovery of the profit rate through the mobilisation of its 
counter-acting tendencies (with special emphasis on the increase of 
labour’ exploitation and the discovery of new markets and fields of 
exploitation) 
(2) the managed devaluation of the overaccumulated capitals so as not 
to end in a disorderly flight, on the one hand, but also to make the 
system leaner and able to restart accumulation from a more healthy 
basis 
The first wave of capitalist restructuring, immediately after the crisis, was 
conservative Keynesian policies. These were based on the assumption that wages 
create inflation and aimed at stimulating demand but at the same time suppressing the 
wage cost. The stimulus packages were offered to firms (through subsidies, tax 
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exemptions etc.) and those failing were rescued through appropriate schemes. 
Moreover, competitive devaluations and were employed and there was a relaxing of 
monetary policy. This type of policies can stimulate demand through firms’ demand 
for inputs and are supposed to stimulate employment (which was not an issue at that 
time) only indirectly and at a lower wage rate. These policies may restore artificially 
the profit rate for a period but they cannot solve the overaccumulation of capitals. 
Quickly they were proved inadequate. 
The next wave of capitalist restructuring that followed was monetarism (i.e. 
the first version of neoliberal economics). Demand stimulus and growth were 
substituted with fighting inflation and stabilizing the economy. State intervention was 
considered guilty for the ineffective and inflationary reheatings of the economy, the 
inadequate devaluation of capital and the ineffective discipline of the working class 
but also of the less profitable capitals. Behind these monetarist credos laid the fact 
that in the relationship between the public and the private sector was summed up a 
concrete balance of power between capital and labour which was functional in the 
post-war period but became dysfunctional after the crisis. Monetarism represented a 
much more brutal attack on labour and as such it had better results in increasing 
labour’s exploitation. However, it had certain major deficiencies. First, it was a policy 
mainly limited around the nation-state and its policies and, thus, could not employ 
adequately a major counter-acting tendency to the falling profit rate, the ‘discovery’ 
of new markets and areas for exploitation. Second, it was a circulationist theory and 
as such it was limited to restructuring the monetary sphere but could not restructure 
properly the fundamental sphere of production. For these reasons this also wave of 
capitalist restructuring failed to solve the problem. 
The next wave of capitalist restructuring (neoliberalism of open economies) 
represented a more radical conservative strategy. Its aim was not simply a more 
‘prudent’ state administration but the radical conservative restructuring of the whole 
socio-economic system. Three were the main elements of this wave: 
(1) the opening of the economy and the internationalization of capital 
which was enforced with the creation of regional blocs and the 
imposition of the Washington Consensus policies. 
(2) The transformation of the financial system towards a more market-
based operation (with the greater emphasis on capital markets as 
opposed to the banking sector) with facilitated the rapid expansion 
of fictitious capital operations. 
(3) the radical restructuring of the labour market with the policies of 
labour flexibility which led to the demolition of the remnants of 
pro-workers provisions 
The attack on labour continued the work of the previous waves through the 
usual means: curtailment of the welfare state, increase of exploitation (through the 
intensification of work and real wages growing slower than productivity – a process 
accelerated from the 1980s and onwards), privatizations etc. But apart from those 
‘traditional’ effects a novel one stands out: from the mid-1990s there is a marked 
increase of the actual working time (see Schor (1991), Mavroudeas & Ioannides 
(2007) etc.). This signifies the reinvigoration, for the first time after a considerable 
historical period, of the extraction of absolute surplus-value. 
The other significant feature of this wave of capitalist restructuring was that it 
actually engineered the so-called globalization (i.e. the second big period of increased 
internationalization of capital after that of the 19th century). The so-called regional 
‘integrations’ represented the creation of regional imperialist pyramids with a usually 
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three-tier structure: the top comprised by the hegemonic imperialist economies, the 
middle comprised of middle-range imperialist economies (partially dependent upon 
the first and able to exploit the weaker ones) and the basis of the ‘poor relatives’. 
These regional blocs imposed their dominance upon economies outside their blocs but 
also played a sophisticated game of rivalry and co-operation between them. On the 
other hand, the imposition of the Washington Consensus rules on particularly the 
developing countries was an essential part of this project. 
Despite its radicalism – and its emphasis on production and fundamental 
structures, as opposed to monetarism’s circulationism – this last wave of capitalist 
restructuring failed also to solve the structural problem of the system. The retreat of 
the state from the economy affected greatly its function as a collective capitalist (i.e. as 
the commanding heights managing and directing the spontaneous market acts in 
favour of the long-run collective interests of the system) and this hindered the exit 
from the structural crisis. Production restructuring was left mainly to private initiative 
and to the now defunct hopes of a technological deus- ex-machina (in the form of the 
‘new economy’ and the information technologies. Both of them failed rather utterly. 
The increase in exploitation counteracted insufficiently the falling profit rate for two 
reasons. First, from one point and onwards the rhythm of increase of the rate of 
surplus-value has to accelerate unrealistically high in order to suppress the falling 
profit rate tendency (see Mavroudeas & Ioannides (2006)). Second, much as it was 
welcomed, the reinvigoration of the extraction of absolute surplus-value makes – 
under certain circumstances – competitive even the more retarded individual capitals. 
Thus, instead of being pressurized by the innovative capitals they are able to survive. 
This vitiates the inherent process of capital devaluation in the face of 
overaccumulation. Moreover, the liberalization and the unregulated expansion of 
finance (the so-called financialisation) have given the system with a vital breathing 
space but at the cost of fomenting greater troubles in the future. One particular 
troubling aspect is that it has increased unproductive activities and labour at the cost of 
productive activities and labour. This has further suppressed the profit rate (see 
Moseley (1985), and for the Greek economy see Maniatis (2005)). All these defects 
had become evident even before the eruption of the current crisis and the end of neo-
liberalism (and heart-searching for a social-liberal successor) had already emerged. 
The current crisis makes these tasks far more urgent. 
In a nut shell, the 1973 structural crisis necessitated a reconfiguration of the 
modus operandi of the capitalist system and ushered a long period of weak capital 
reproduction. During this period of ‘silent depression’ its effects (e.g. high 
unemployment, firms’ high bankruptcy rates) were not fully upheld mainly because 
the system tried to alleviate part of the necessary capital devaluation through the use of 
appropriate institutions and policies. Therefore, the three main waves of capitalist 
restructuring tackled facets of the systemic problem but failed to solve the problem as 
such. The current crisis is tantamount to that. 
 
 
 
II.3 The 1973 crisis and capitalist restructuring in Greece 
 
The 1973 crisis was doubly onerous for Greek capitalism. The first burden 
was the crisis itself in both its international and national dimension. It has been shown 
(Maniatis, Tsaliki & Tsoulfidis (1999), Maniatis (2005)) that the Greek crisis was also 
caused by falling profitability due to the increase of the organic composition of 
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capital. As already said, similarly to the general patterns the crisis ended the post-war 
‘golden age’ of Greek capitalism. 
But the crisis was accompanied by a second burden. It coincided with a period 
of intensified class struggle marked by the fall of the military dictatorship and the 
eruption of popular radicalism. The previous ‘golden age’ took place in the post-civil 
war era (following the defeat of the communist Left) that was marked by an autarchic 
bourgeois state and the brutal suppression of the Left and the labour movement. This 
contributed substantially to capital’s profitability. A particular aspect of this period 
was a limited welfare state and the lack of progressive Keynesian policies – that 
characterized the more developed economies after the war. State intervention was 
crucial – since this is a general characteristic of Greek capitalism from its very birth 
and almost irrespective of general trends – but this took place through conservative 
Keynesian policies. The fall of the dictatorship put an end to all these. Popular 
struggles pressed for a radical income redistribution that would return to labour at 
least a greater part of its contribution to the post-war ‘miracle’. In particular, the 
creation of a developed welfare system, the amelioration of labour relations and 
substantial wage increases of labour’s remuneration were demanded. The force of this 
movement – and the concomitant danger of uncontrollable socio-political changes - 
was so strong that no bourgeois political party attempted to confront it directly. On 
the contrary, they tried to accommodate these pressures through partial reforms and 
rampant clientelism. This Greek specificity, combined with other structural 
differences from the West, desynchronized its evolution from that of the latter.  
Hence, contrary to the international trends, in Greece progressive Keynesian 
policies were implemented at the very time that they were discarded elsewhere. 
Consequently, the conservative and neoliberal waves of capitalist restructuring took 
place in Greece with a significant time lag. 
 
 
The post-dictatorship progressive Keynesian policies 
Immediately after the fall of the dictatorship both New Democracy (during the 
‘social-mania’ period) and PASOK (especially during its first years of governance 
[1981 - 1984]) used progressive Keynesian policies of state regulation and income 
redistribution. These policies - more weak and uncoordinated for ND and more 
structured and clearly formulated for PASOK – were essentially trying to combine (a) 
a strengthening of growth (at a time when growth slowed down internationally 
because of the economic crisis) with (b) a controlled income redistribution in favour 
of labour but in some a manner as not affect dramatically the capitalist profit. The 
economic policy of the first PASOK government was seeking long-term restructuring 
of the productive economy by supporting the development process (Tsakalotos 
(1998)). In particular (see Argitis (2002, p.77-78)), the macroeconomic policy of the 
first PASOK government aimed at (a) reducing inflation and balance of payments 
deficit, (b) reducing unemployment and increasing the rate of economic growth and 
(c) a more equitable income distribution. 
These policies have improved labour’s position and at the same time helped to 
defuse the post-dictatorship popular radicalism and accommodate it in the system 
mainly through an extensive system of patronage (which did not take long to develop 
into a widespread system of corruption). A typical example of the first process is the 
expansionary incomes policy of the first PASOK government especially after the 
introduction in 1982 of a system of wages auto-indexing to inflation (ATA). The 
result was a significant (and long-overdue) increase in workers’ real wages. 
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However, these post-dictatorship progressive Keynesian policies failed to 
address the economic crisis because they applied the successful post-war recipes in 
totally different socio-economic conditions. These policies offered the final solution 
to the previous structural crisis of capitalism (which sparked the crises of 1873-73 and 
of 1929-30) through demand stimulus but only after the drastic devaluation of 
overaccumulated capitals produced by the two world wars. Hence the burst of the 
‘bubble’ of overaccumulated capitals and the return to leaner and healthier 
dimensions facilitated the return to growth. Then part of the fruits of growth could 
pass to labour (in order to emasculate its radicalism) without curtailing seriously 
capitalist profit. Contrary to the western experience, this redistribution to labour has 
not been applied in Greece (at least extensively) because the defeat in the civil war 
and the iron hand of the bourgeois state kept Left and the labour movement 
suppressed. There was a minor redistribution but not primarily towards labour but 
rather towards the middle strata in order to bolster the social alliance against the Left. 
After 1973 all these changed in Greece. The iron hand of the post-civil war 
bourgeois state has been severely weakened and the labour movement returned with 
vengeance. But the post-war western recipe could not be effective for obvious 
reasons. This was the main reason (other than individual internal contradictions) of 
the so-called macroeconomic policy’s ‘credibility gap of the first PASOK 
government. The result was failure since expansive growth was not achieved and 
redistribution in labour’s favour started to erode capitalist accumulation. As soon as 
the post-dictatorship popular radicalism started to weaken there was a move towards a 
more conservative economic policy and capitalist restructuring policies were 
rigorously applied from 1985 and onwards. This move was closely related to Greek 
capital’s choice to energetically join the European integration project. Contrary to 
propaganda credos about EEC (European Economic Community) securing democracy 
in Greece, this move actually secured the system and enabled it to move – slowly in 
the beginning but accelerating afterwards – towards conservative policies of capitalist 
restructuring. 
 
 
Conservative Keynesian capitalist restructuring and the shift to neoliberal directions 
Conservative Keynesian restructuring policies started creeping in slowly. 
Thus, in 1983 the PASOK government eroded the ATA system by limiting full 
indexation only to low paid workers. From 1983 to 1984 incomes policy also became 
less expansionary. 
The 1985 stability programme of the second PASOK government marked a 
decisive conservative turn. The programme’s focused on the opening of the Greek 
economy in accordance with the requirements of joining the EEC. It aimed to reverse 
the initial negative impact on profits from the opening of the economy and to shift the 
burden to labour (Giannitsis (1993)). Basically this program and the associated 
economic policies were akin to the conservative Keynesian restructuring policies used 
in most western countries in the aftermath of the 1973 crisis. 
The shift to conservative policies continued throughout the politically 
turbulent period that followed despite some wavering caused by the electoral 
competition between PASOK and ND and the still strong social reactions. So, 
gradually, restrictive incomes policy, permanent austerity (with income redistribution 
of income in favour of capital), privatisations of public enterprises, the inelastic 
exchange policy and the withdrawal of market regulations constituted the core of 
economic policy. 
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After the election victory of PASOK in 1985, the neoconservative turn was 
formally instituted. The new two-year economic stabilization program reversed 
completely the short-lived electoral expansive incomes policy1. In this new 
stabilization program stabilisation was set as the primary objective of stability and all 
economic policies (income, fiscal, monetary) took a restrictive direction. Particularly 
regarding incomes policy, the ATA system was eroded further once again2. This 
resulted in a dramatic decline in real wages during the 1986-7 period by more than 
11% (Argitis (2002), p.92). Similarly, the Bank of Greece (1988) estimated that 
labour costs were reduced by 13.3% in 1986 and by 10.6% in 1987. 
These conservative Keynesian restructuring policies had limited results. One 
of the more serious implications of the crisis was the weakening of Greek industry, 
which had a serious negative impact on Greece’s position in the international division 
of labour and on its balance of payments (Giannitsis (1993)). It also had long-term 
negative effects on the internal structure of Greek capitalism. The opening of the 
economy deteriorated in several areas the position of the Greek capital. It is indicative 
that 85% of the deterioration of the competitive position of key sectors of Greek 
industry was caused by its deterioration in competitiveness against the EU and only 
15% by that against third countries (Giannitsis (1993)). The 1985 stabilization 
program improved profits at the expense of wages but did not inhibit the deterioration 
of the international competitive position of the Greek capital (for the crucial case of 
industry see Giannitsis (1993)). 
During that period a crucial trend started in Greece - spontaneously and 
without a systematic and legislative promotion - that was noticed also in other 
economies: actual working time started to increase. It has been shown (see 
Mavroudeas & Ioannidis (2004)) that beginning in 1985 there is significant upward 
trend in the actual work-time (as in the case of the U.S.) which was boosted with the 
passing of time. This, coupled with the real wages’ increases lagging behind 
productivity increases strengthens especially in the Greek case the process of 
extraction of absolute surplus-value. This is reinforced by the fact that, as noted by 
Carchedi (1999), the European integration forces the less developed countries to boost 
the extraction of absolute surplus-value. Less developed European economies lag 
technologically behind their developed ‘partners’ and are unable to compete on the 
basis of the extraction of relative surplus-value. Thus their only outlet is the extension 
of working time, usually under the threat of bankruptcy in the face of foreign 
competition. 
 
 
The adoption of neoliberal restructuring policies 
The conservative Keynesian policies paved the way and then gave their place 
to the neoconservative policies that had already dominated the world. These were 
formally introduced by the 1990 ND government. All successive governments of ND 
                                                 
1 This brief for completely for electoral purposes return to progressive redistribution 
was marked by the expulsion of the architect of the 1985 stabilization program Simitis 
and the infamous quote ‘Tsovolas Give them all’ (the then finance minister) 
2 The expected rate of imported inflation was deducted from the general inflation rate 
and wages were adjusted this lesser rate. Moreover, indexation was further restricted 
only to wage-earners with a less than 150,000 drachmas gross income. This was 
accompanied by legislation that penalised private firms that violated the incomes 
policy. 
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and PASOK faithfully followed the neo-liberal capitalist policies of restructuring. 
Furthermore, as Greek capitalist restructuring was already lagging significantly the 
introduction of neoconservative policies did not pass first from a monetarist and then 
an open economy phase but proceeded almost directly to the latter. Crucial role in this 
played the EU directives and particularly those of the EMU. 
So, from 1991 to 1993 the ND government implemented a restrictive 
macroeconomic policy (particularly regarding monetary and incomes policy) together 
with an extensive privatisation plan. Capital was overtly favoured and 
macroeconomic policy took an overtly conservative character. Two examples are 
indicative. First, the 1992 tax reform reduced tax rates for higher incomes and gave 
the system an even more un-progressive character. Profits were also taxed more 
favourably. This path was followed since then by all subsequent governments. 
Second, in 1991 ND abolished the ATA system and also in 1992 froze wages in the 
public sector – and the private sector more or less followed suit - resulting in 
significant reduction in wage-earners’ incomes. This freeze was unprecedented for the 
post-dictatorship era and opened the way for the more conservative measures that 
followed. 
Finally, the 1991-93 ND government launched two other important neoliberal 
reforms. First, it accelerated the liberalization of the financial system (which had 
already been inaugurated by PASOK). Second, it legislated a series of changes in 
industrial relations (e.g. fourth shift, part-time) that reinforced significantly capital’s 
prerogatives. 
The neoliberal capitalist restructuring agenda introduced in 1991 formed the 
basis of the policies of all the subsequent governments of PASOK and ND. This 
agenda includes: 
(1) widespread privatization of public enterprises 
(2) significant cuts in social security (by reducing benefits, increasing 
contributions, increased retirement age) and privatisation of parts of the welfare 
system. 
(3) tax reforms benefiting the wealthiest sections of the population via (a) 
reducing tax rates for higher income levels, (b) reducing corporate taxes, (c) 
increasing indirect taxation (affecting predominantly popular consumption) and (d) 
the systematic non-indexation of the minimum tax free threshold. 
(4) deregulation of labour relations and the introduction of flexible forms of 
employment with the simultaneous depreciation of any protection mechanism of 
labour rights. 
The economic policies of the Simitis governments of PASOK hold a special 
place in this canvas of neo-liberal restructuring. With its religious adherence to the 
EMU requirements and rules it expanded and deepened furthermore the neoliberal 
policies. In order to achieve entrance to the EMU it instituted austerity at the expense 
of labour as wage costs had lag behind productivity increases. It repeatedly and 
systematically reformed labour law in the direction of deregulation and flexibility 
(introduction of part-time, extended part-time ‘arrangements’ of working time, private 
firms hiring and lending workers, weakening of collective bargaining etc.). It 
expanded privatisation programmes and also provided even more space within the 
Greek economy to foreign capitals. It reformed the welfare system curtailing benefits 
even though it failed – due to strong strike action – to proceed even further. Finally, it 
facilitated actively two major one-off acts of income redistribution from the working 
and middle classes to capital. The first was the so-called ‘stock-exchange theft’ in 
which savings from the popular and middle classes were systematically driven by 
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government’s economic policy to a stock market bubble. The burst of the bubble 
resulted in dramatic losses but also provided firms with cheap funds. The second was 
government’s conscious refusal to control inflationary pressures caused by the 
adoption of the euro which led to a dramatic erosion of the purchasing power of 
popular and middle classes3. The latter – and particularly the middle classes – in order 
to sustain their living status turned to bank loans. This profited the banking sector but 
also created a previously unknown in Greek society level of private debt. 
The entrance in the EMU transformed the whole socio-economic landscape 
completely as the Greek economy came under the rule of the Maastricht Treaty 
clauses. The consequences of this will be examined later. Meanwhile three other 
developments that affected drastically the Greek economy in the 1990s should be 
acknowledged. The first is that the collapse of the Eastern bloc opened a new area of 
opportunities and exploitation for Greek capital, particularly in the Balkans. The 
second is the massive influx of economic migrants from these and other countries. 
This facilitated the depression of wages (particularly in certain sectors) and the wider 
implementation of flexible working relations. Finally, the 2004 Olympics had 
engineered an artificial economic growth, as public works and infrastructure were 
hastily procured at usually exorbitant costs. It is well known that the Athens 2004 
Olympics are the more expensive in history. Private capital - Greek and foreign - 
profiteered shamelessly from this. As it turned out, many of these works were either 
proved useless or had insignificant long-term multiple benefits for the Greek 
economy. 
Overall, as it will be explained in following chapters, capitalist restructuring in 
Greece had the same results as elsewhere: it alleviated part of the burdens on capitalist 
profitability but it had failed to solve the structural problems of capitalist 
accumulation. 
 
 
III. Greek capitalism and the European imperialist bloc 
 
III.1 Greece: from the EEC to EU and the EMU 
 
On January 1st 2001 Greece formally entered the European Monetary Union 
(EMU) and euro substituted the drachma as monetary unit. This was a crucial moment 
for the longitudinal and sustained effort of the Greek bourgeoisie to participate in the 
European imperialist integration. For the Greek bourgeoisie the entrance to the EEC 
secured not democracy but capitalist domination and exploitation in an era when the 
struggle between East and West was continuing and the capitalist system was disputed 
                                                 
3 All European central banks were aware that the introduction of the new currency 
will cause inflationary pressures particularly in countries (like Greece) where the 
purchasing power of the new currency unit deviated widely from that of the old one. 
This deviation troubled the average consumer and made him to lose a sense of the real 
purchasing power of new currency. In Greece, unlike other countries, no provision 
was taken when firms and chains of distribution took advantage of this lack of 
awareness and skyrocketed the prices particularly the mass consumption goods. Thus, 
inflation became rampant particularly in the category of mass consumption goods 
whereas its general rate remained rather tame (see Zografakis & Mitrakos (2005). 
Meanwhile, wages have roughly followed the official inflation rate. Hence, firms 
marked-up their profit rates at the expense of wages’ purchasing power. 
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after the fall of the dictatorship. Moreover, with the eruption of the 1973 global 
structural crisis of capitalism – which coincided in Greece with the fall of the 
dictatorship and the beginning of an era in which the Left and workers’ militancy was 
on the ascendancy – the participation in the European integration promised to buttress 
economic performance and capitalist profitability. First, the European integration 
offered the prospect of a wider market, comparing with the rather small size of the 
Greek one. Second, and even more important, it offered to Greek capitalism the clout 
of an at least second class imperialist power (comparing to its lesser status before) 
which enabled it to exploit better other economies and regions. Third, and equally 
important, it provided a superior economic mechanism and a powerful ideological 
weapon, at the same time, in order to increase the exploitation of the Greek working 
class: the participation to the EEC was presented as the entrance to paradise (or an 
new era where ‘the people will eat with golden forks’, to remember an older slogan 
used by the bourgeoisie during the Greek civil war in order to make US anti-
communist aid popular). 
Moreover, Greek capitalism entered the EEC at a rather lucky moment. At that 
time EEC was eager to attract more members and thus was willing to ‘sweeten’ the 
integration process and make-up for its costs by offering packages of economic aid. 
Thus, capitalist activities but also the middle classes and the agricultural sector 
prospered by taking advantage of these packages. This gave to the EEC a popular 
appeal and obscured its hidden burdens. 
Things started to change rapidly in the 1990s. The collapse of the Eastern 
block, the internal defeats of the labour movement and the continuation of the 
capitalist structural crisis changed the situation. Capital became both nationally and at 
the European level more aggressive and at the same time more pressurised. First, the 
continuation of the crisis, despite the victories over the labour movement and 
significant gains in profitability, made capitalism more eager for a decisive 
breakthrough. Thus, austerity policies – now under the rubric of convergence and 
stability programmes – became more aggressive. Second, the collapse of the East led 
to the emergence of the till then latent intra-capitalist antagonisms between the US, 
Europe and Japan. This intensified intra-capitalist and intra-imperialist rivalries. 
Germany, the basic power behind European integration, pushed for a stronger both 
economically and politically European integration under its hegemony. At the same 
time the opening of the Central and Eastern European countries lowered the 
importance of the South European less developed economies. This led, together with 
the intensification of crisis and competition, to a tendency to curtail aid packages to 
less developed countries and problematic sectors. This affected the agricultural sector 
– where the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is an obvious failure sustained for 
political reasons only – and those capitals, small businesses and self-employed that 
prospered through EU aid packages. 
The entrance to the EMU led to the final disillusionment. It was professed as a 
‘national goal’ and a decisive upgrade of the Greek economy. However, as soon as the 
entrance was achieved the true face of the EU appeared: instead of a relaxation of 
austerity and a boost to people’s incomes and welfare the Stability Pact dictated new – 
even more harsh – rounds of austerity. At the same time the euro is being proven as 
extremely problematic. The price level has increased significantly particularly for the 
basic consumption goods and Greek families start to realize that it constitutes a drain 
to their pockets. Additionally, the international competitiveness of Greek products has 
deteriorated because of the euro in crucial sectors such as tourism. Finally, the old 
bastion of pro-European feelings – the agricultural sector – has become a hotbed of 
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anti-EU mobilisations as the successive changes of the CAP has eroded its incomes 
and is leading towards the annihilation of small peasants and family farming. Last, the 
aggravation of the crisis has led to a new European wave of enterprises’ mergers and 
acquisitions, which was facilitated by the EMU. Greek capitalist enterprises are not 
faring very well in this wave, as they are ‘small fish’ comparing to their European 
partners and competitors. Thus, sections of Greek capital started becoming restless as 
their bigger foreign counterparts were buying them cheaply. 
 
 
III.2 The class character of the European integration 
 
The European integration is a capitalist and imperialist project. It began as an 
economic, social and political buffer against the labour movement and the Eastern 
bloc, which contained intra-European rivalries under the US and NATO auspices. It 
helped reconstruct and secure capitalist relations of production after the 2nd World 
War against a militant working class. It set a framework constraining intra-capitalist 
struggles to functional levels and securing capitalist development. The latter had spill-
over effects to the working class in the sense that a part of the new surplus produced 
by workers was allowed to return to them in the form of better wages (which however 
did not cover the full contribution of labour). These better wages helped the system to 
dominate ideologically the working masses against both internal disputes and the 
external challenge of the Eastern bloc. Also against the ‘external enemy’ the 
European integration helped to keep Western European countries together and not 
falling one after the other under the influence of the Eastern bloc (as it had happened 
with several Central European countries). 
With the end of bipolism Germany, the main hegemonic power, started 
aspiring to a stronger international role. Thus, in accordance with France’s similar 
aspirations, it pushed for a stronger, more tightly knit integration. It is indicative that 
when the Maastricht Treaty was signed the then French president Francois Mitterrand 
declared that now Europe becomes the first global power. 
Thus, beginning even before the collapse of bipolism, a common monetary 
architecture was added to the common market of the EEC. This was supposed to be 
able to challenge the global hegemony of the US dollar, which is one of the main 
American economic weapons. The common monetary structure was supplemented 
with the further political integration of the member-countries and the strengthening of 
centralised mechanisms. The transformation of the EEC to the EU marked this 
process. Of course, the bigger powers (Germany etc.) are the true bosses behind this 
process. 
On the other hand, the US became even more suspicious towards European 
integration as it considers it as a possible imperialist competitor. Hence, it uses all its 
power to undermine it. The US does not strive to dissolve the EU. Rather, they push 
for a loose and weak economically and politically (and after all militarily) European 
integration that would not be able to challenge their dominance. Thus, contrary to 
Germany and the other more antagonistic to the US European powers, they favour a 
broad expansion of the EU (through the entrance of many new countries-members) 
that would make difficult any closer integration and a more tight control by Germany. 
On the other hand, Germany and France attempt to side-step the problem by delaying 
the entrance of many new-comers and by moving towards a two or even three-levels 
European integration where the more advanced countries would constitute the hard 
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core and the other one or two zones the periphery. The latter would have a limited 
impact on the main decision centres. 
In a nutshell, the European integration is a capitalist-imperialist project that 
facilitated the better exploitation of the working classes of the European countries, the 
dominance of its core economies over its ‘peripheral’ ones, the containment to 
acceptable levels of intra-capitalist and intra-imperialist antagonisms and the 
enhanced imperialist dominance over other countries and regions. 
 
 
III.3 European integration: from the common market to the EMU 
 
The beginning of the European integration project was the creation of a 
common market. However, it soon moved on to the construction of a common 
monetary structure. It began in 1971 with the Werner plan, which failed but left 
behind the ECU (a logistical unit). Other attempts followed (‘the snake in the 
channel’, the European Monetary System (EMS) etc.) all of which failed for a number 
of reasons. The idea of a monetary integration resurfaced in the middle of the 1980s 
and was agreed in 1991 with the Maastricht Treaty. The latter posed a more ambitious 
aim: the creation of a common European currency, the euro. The euro project has 
inscribed in it the ambition of the European imperialist bloc to create a competitor to 
dollar in the role of international reserve currency and, consequently, of challenging 
US hegemony in a crucial area. 
Monetary integration has a number of crucial merits for capitalist 
accumulation in the European countries. First, it facilitates and develops further the 
common market. Now this wider market is even more accessible because instabilities 
and problems due to monetary differences are eliminated. 
Second, it imposes even stronger discipline to intra-capitalist and intra-
imperialist antagonisms. Previously, the capitals of a less developed country (with 
lower labour productivity) could repulse competition from the more developed ones 
(with higher labour productivity and thus, possibly, lower prices) by resorting to 
competitive devaluation. By devaluing their currency they could make their products 
cheaper in international markets and thus compete with the more developed countries, 
which fall pray to their stronger currencies. With the EMS the range of these 
competitive devaluations was constrained. With the euro they become non-existent. 
Third, all these oblige capitals to solve their profitability problems not by 
recoursing mainly to intra-capitalist competition (although this remains live and 
vibrant) but through the increased and more efficient exploitation of workers. 
On the other hand the EMU project is fraught with dangers and difficulties. 
First, it carries with it significant risks. Second, there are winners and losers within its 
ranks. 
The risks have to do with its well-known problem of being a non-optimal 
currency area. Setting aside the mainstream jargon, this means that it tries to put under 
the same monetary mean several very diverse economies. Again, setting aside the 
mainstream utopias about convergence, these economies instead of converging they 
have actually started to diverge dangerously (see Christodoulakis (2009)). 
Furthermore, crises tend to have ‘asymmetric’ effects on diverse economies and thus 
they exacerbate their imbalances. This strains even more the function of common 
monetary mean. The current crisis is a typical example of this case and it had, 
rightfully, challenged the very existence of the euro. 
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Moreover, the EMU project did not create an equitable angelic world for all its 
participants but favoured some at the expense of others. 
It is obvious today that it boosted both the competitiveness as well as the 
overall dominance of a ‘hard core’ around Germany at the expense of the less 
developed economies and particular the European South. This is recognized even by 
fervent supporters of the European integration project (e.g. Christodoulakis (2009)) 
when noting that the EMU had exacerbated the polarization between these two 
groups. Characteristically, Christodoulakis (2009, p.32) acknowledges that the most 
crucial asymmetry in the Eurozone has been the emergence of huge disparities in the 
Current Accounts and the Trade Balances, with the Northern members (Germany, 
Finland, Netherlands, Austria and Belgium) reaping large surpluses while the 
Southern (Portugal, Spain and Greece) ones suffering huge external deficits ranging 
from 10-15%. Apart from politico-economic scheming and institutional designs at the 
commanding heights of the EU, the main fundamental cause of this dichotomy is the 
fact that the abolition of national monetary, industrial and commercial policies (and 
the severe curtailment of the fiscal policies for the weaker economies) made intra-EU 
competition a competition on the basis of ‘absolute advantage’. This has the 
distinctive characteristic (sometimes branded neo-mercantilism) that the gains of the 
winners have to be paid by those left behind. This has exacerbating unequal 
development and the divergence between the two main groups of EU. 
Additionally, the ceding of monetary and commercial policy to Brussels had 
adverse policy effects for the European Southern group. Both these policies followed 
the needs of the Northern group which were quite different from the former. For 
example, for a significant period, monetary policy remained lax – according to the 
Northern needs – whereas the Southern group was requiring a more strict conduct. 
This intensified the dilapidation of South’s productive structure as it favoured sectors 
linked to the Northern group and damaged others more crucial for national 
development. Furthermore, it created an environment favouring conservation of 
unrealistic growth rates based on external borrowing (as the Maastricht Treaty 
effectively prohibited internal borrowing). This created the basis of the current debt 
problems of the European South. 
All these internal contradictions of the European integration project were 
pushed to their limits by the current crisis as it aggravated the weaknesses of the 
Southern group and brought forward the dangers of default of several of its 
economies. On top of that, the policy responses devised by the EU favoured further 
the interests of the Northern group (and particular sectors of it) at the expense of the 
Southern group. An indicative example is that the usurious rates of lending to the 
Southern economies facilitate extremely low rates for Germany. This is typical in 
intra-imperialist rivalries where a stronger thief is stealing a weaker one. 
 
 
IV. The current crisis and the Greek problem 
 
IV.1 The current crisis 
 
The current crisis is not an ‘autonomous’ crisis and, moreover, it is not just a 
financial crisis (as claimed by both mainstream and certain radical approaches). It is a 
continuation of the 1973 structural crisis and it is grounded first and foremost in the 
sphere of production (and not in circulation and the financial system). 
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As already argued before, capitalist restructurings that followed the outbreak 
of the crisis of 1973-1975 resulted in a relatively sluggish recovery in profitability and 
the accumulation but failed to solve the long-term problem of finding a new 
functional and sustainable system architecture. This sluggish rebound went through a 
series of cyclical backdrops that also correspond to more or less severe crises (e.g. the 
1987 crash, currency crises of the 1990s). It was marked by a downturn in the period 
2000-2003 followed by a recovery in 2003-2007. However, immediately after the 
recession of 2000-3, there were signs of deceleration in the rate of increase of labour 
exploitation (the rate of surplus-value), which was the main factor behind the 
recovery of the profit rate and capital accumulation. In the case of the US economy 
there was a faltering of the growth rate form 2005 which was preceded by a 
deceleration in the rate of increase of labour productivity (which also shows the 
declining rate of growth of labour exploitation). 
Confronted with this situation, the system had recourse since 2000, to an 
escape forward. The financial system – through mainly fictitious capital operations - 
fuelled with liquidity the system and thus helped to create investment and 
consumption. This has reinforced the further expansion of money capital. This is a 
well-known phenomenon in the phase of gestation of a crisis. This credit-fuelled 
expansion actually deferred to the future the problems of real capital accumulation at 
the cost of augmenting them. The development of fictitious capital led through 
leveraging (the new financial products) in ‘bubbles’ and therefore aggravated the 
overaccumulation of capital. All this ‘crazy circus’ could continue functioning so long 
as it could increase rapidly the exploitation of labour. To put it simply, the fuelling of 
capitalist accumulation through bets on extracted in the future increased surplus-value 
(i.e. the operation of fictitious capital) could continue so long as the system was able, 
in the next period, to continue extracting increased surplus-value. The mechanism 
through which was generated this increased surplus-value took the following form: 
workers offered more work-time (with less payment) in exchange for the preservation 
of their disposable income. That is, workers increased their working time (increasing 
unevenly the unpaid proportion of it) in order to maintain their purchasing power. 
From the very moment that this process of an increasing rate of surplus-value began 
to falter (for obvious reasons as it challenged its social, technical and physical limits) 
then the ‘bets’ collapsed. The expectations for the entrepreneurial projects to continue 
generating increasing surplus-value collapsed. This is the US was expressed first in 
the sub-prime sector (and for this the initial characterisation of the crisis as a subprime 
crisis). The inability of the workers to offer more paid and unpaid work-time, and thus 
continue to service the debts they have acquired (in order to sustain their living status) 
led to the collapse of the mortgage market. This was the beginning for unravelling the 
whole texture. The problem in the sphere of real accumulation punctured the financial 
bubble and then the whole system took fire. The inability of productive capital to 
continue generating surplus-value with the required rapid rhythms bite the abnormally 
high share of capital gains that were redistributed to the money capital (out of the 
surplus-value extracted under the auspices of productive capital). This led to the 
bankruptcy of several financial organisations and these bankruptcies and problems in 
the financial system returned to bite productive capital through traditional and well-
known channels. 
Thus, the current crisis is the continuation of the structural drop in profitability 
in 1973 and shares the same fundamental causes, i.e. the tendency of the rate of profit 
to fall due to the increase of the organic composition of capital (see Shaikh (2011)). It 
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reflects also the failure of the subsequent waves of capitalist restructuring to solve the 
structural problem of the system. 
 
 
IV.2 The Greek twin crisis 
 
The current crisis in Greece is a twin crisis in the sense that apart from its 
general fundamental cause (the capital overaccumulation crisis because of the falling 
profitability and the failure of the waves of capitalist restructuring to solve the 
structural problem of capital reproduction) has a specific Greek component.  
As already argued before, as elsewhere the waves of capitalist restructuring in 
Greece have failed to solve the systemic problem because of their inherent 
deficiencies. Thus, crisis was simmering in the Greek economy for its very internal 
reasons. However, this crisis tendency was aggravated by the additional structural 
problems caused by Greece’s participation in the EU. It has been shown in previous 
sections that this participation carried with it advantages but is also fraught with 
dangers. To sum up, the advantages have to do with (a) upgrading from a middle-
range imperialist status to a ‘partner’ in a first-class imperialist club and (b) the 
enhanced ability first to secure the system (in the immediate post-dictatorship period) 
and then to push forward capitalist restructuring. The risks have to do with (a) the 
downgrading within the ranks of this imperialist club and (b) the lack of necessary 
policy instruments in the face of grave contingencies. 
All these advantages and disadvantages were ultimately related to the 
productive structure of the Greek economy. Before it entrance in the EEC Greek 
capitalism had a rather coherent productive structure which was competitive both 
against the European economies and other economies in the Mediterranean region 
particularly. This productive structure was heavily protected and supported through 
direct and indirect means. The opening of the economy in the common market was a 
significant bet: Greek productive capital – and the whole capital circuit en suite – had 
to restructure in order to remain competitive in the new environment. It is now 
evident that the Greek capital lost this bet. Greece’s trade balance with the European 
countries from positive became negative after the entrance in the common market. It 
deteriorated further with the entrance in the EMU. This deterioration was not confined 
to intra-EU trade but was generalized. This is acknowledged even by supporters of the 
participation in the EEC and the EMU who attempted to moderate the extent of the 
problem. For example, Papazoglou (2009, p.40) accepts that ‘Greece’s participation in 
the EU and the creation of the Single Market did not cause significant structural 
changes that would contribute to strengthening, both in terms of price and quality, the 
competitiveness of Greek products in international markets’. Similarly, Maliaropoulos 
(2010) admits that the competitiveness of the Greek economy has deteriorated 
significantly since EMU. Estimates of this deterioration in terms of relative unit labour 
costs, for the period 2000-9, vary between 9% (IMF) and 27% (Bank of Greece). Based 
on relative prices, the competitiveness of the Greek economy has deteriorated since 2000 
by between 18% (ECB, Bank of Greece) and 21% (IMF). 
In a nutshell, Greek capitalism’s accession in the European integration dismantled 
its previous coherent and competitive productive structure without replacing it with 
another equally or more successful. On the contrary, the Greek economy became, to a 
great extent, a supplement of its North European partners. This has not transformed it to a 
dependent economy – in the sense usually employed by dependency theory. Greek 
capitalism remained a middle-range developed and imperialist economy. However, it was 
downgraded comparing to its more developed partners. 
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On the other hand, the accession in the European integration helped crucially 
Greek capital in its interior front against labour. It further helped it in its imperialist 
forays in other areas. The most exemplary case is it economic ‘invasion’ in the Balkans 
after the collapse of the Eastern bloc. Greek investments in these countries boosted capital 
profitability through extra profits for a considerable period and helped sustain high rates 
of growth for several years. This gave the false image – which was very similar to that of 
Portugal and Ireland – of an economic miracle and a ‘strong Greece’. This situation and 
the concomitant imagery were actively boosted by the successive governments of 
PASOK and ND from 1999 till 2009. In fact an artificial growth was engineered based on 
(a) investments in (to a great extent useless and overpriced) infrastructure; particularly 
around the 2004 Athens Olympics and (b) low interest rates (guided by ECB policy) that 
overheated the economy. This spree was ultimately based on public expenditure (either 
directly through public works or indirectly by subsidizing private businesses4) which, 
in turn, was financed through public loans. This public debt became external debt 
because foreign loans were offered easily and rather cheaply – during that period – 
and because the Maastricht Treaty effectively prohibited internal loaning. 
The eruption of the current crisis put an end to this masquerade and 
transformed the country from a ‘strong Greece’ to the beggar of Europe. The crisis 
brought forth all the previously lurking behind structural problems of the Greek 
economy and aggravated them further. The Balkan ‘Eldorado’ was hit hard quite early 
and this curtailed the extra profits the Greek capital was reaping in that area. This 
happened for another reason. The Balkan economies slumped and at the same time 
international competition and rivalries within them were aggravated. That is, Greek 
capital faced more intense competition in these economies mainly from some of its 
European partners. On the other hand, the crisis put an end to cheap credit and thus 
worsened business environment. And on top of that, the lurking overaccumulation 
crisis resurfaced. All these happened in an economy whose productive structure has 
lost any coherence and was proved extremely uncompetitive against its partners and 
its main competitors. 
Then the crisis took the form of the so-called ‘twin deficits’, i.e. an exorbitant 
public deficit coupled with an external deficit. More specifically, and differently from 
other economies suffering from the same deficits, the Greek external debt was public 
rather than private. Long before the eruption of the crisis the bourgeois state 
subsidised directly and indirectly capitalist accumulation in Greece. It is a well-known 
feature of the Greek private sector that it depends heavily upon government support 
and public expenditure. Thus the state borrowed in order to subsidise capital 
accumulation and, to a lesser extent, to buttress its clientelism; which is necessary in 
order to secure political and social acquiescence to its policies. Particularly after the 
accession in the EMU public expenditure was financed through international (rather 
than internal) loans. So long as the engineered growth and the extra profits from the 
Balkan ‘Eldorado’ continued taxation was able to service this debt and keep it within 
manageable limits. Of course, habitual slays of hand were extensively employed in 
order to masquerade the extent of the public debt. But this was not something new or 
something that other countries have not used as well. And so long as there were 
                                                 
4 It is ironic that, under an infamous law passed by a previous PASOK government, 
the Greek state subsidized firms to relocate to the other Balkan economies. That 
meant the end of the textile industry in Northern Greece as Greek capitals took the 
subsidies, closed their factories, fired their workers, and relocated across the border 
where wages were far cheaper. 
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abundant international loanable funds willing to lent the country at rather reasonable 
rates there was no problem in the management of both the public and the external 
deficit. 
But the eruption of the crisis created insurmountable problems to this circuit. 
First, as states around the world introduced hastily fiscal packages and monetary 
instruments in order to save failing businesses, public debts increased worldwide. 
This brought forward the question whether there would be a recovery and if this 
would be sufficiently strong in order to cover the expenses advanced of the aid 
packages. So long as evidence suggested either a protracted recession or a double dip 
or some other version of continuation of the problems then the coverage of these aid 
packages by revenues generated from future growth rates was seriously disputed. 
Consequently, the public deficits in order to finance these aid packages looked 
increasing unsustainable. This transformed the crisis to a fiscal crisis as well. The 
fiscal crisis did not hit equally all possible culprits. International money funds coming 
mainly from the dominant imperialist countries by-passed the significant fiscal 
problems of these economies and concentrated in the problems of other weaker 
economies. By starting to question the sustainability of their fiscal deficits they were 
able to impose almost usurious rates of interest for their loans to them. Thus their 
public deficits were almost single-handedly transformed to unmanageable external 
deficits. So long as these countries were not able to generate external surpluses (for 
example through trade) then servicing these external deficits became problematic and 
the question of default was posed. 
The course described above was the one that Greece followed. The exhaustion 
of its external imperialist gains coupled with the falling internal profitability and the 
dismantling of the economy’s productive structure crippled capital accumulation. 
This, in its turn, crippled the ability of the state to subsidise capital accumulation and 
created a fiscal crisis. Subsequently, the fiscal crisis led to an external debt crisis 
exactly because of the falling competitiveness of the Greek economy. Thus, at the 
basis of the economy’s bankruptcy lays its productive bankruptcy for which the 
accession in the European integration project is one of the main culprits. 
 
 
IV.3 The EU-IMF intervention: Greek economy in the straitjackets 
 
The fact that the Greek economy is in deep trouble for both internal and 
external reasons does not suffice for making it the ‘black sheep’ of Europe and one of 
the main troublemakers worldwide. It is true that the Greek twin deficits are very high 
but other countries have similar and equally (if not more) grave problems. Even 
today, there are other countries that have a higher percentage of debt relative to GDP 
than Greece (e.g. 170% in Japan. The U.S. has a very similar problem, too: its debt is 
estimated to reach 90% of the GDP, and it is expected to take 10 years for it to return 
to ‘manageable’ levels. Even within the Eurozone, according to the Eurostat data for 
2009, Italy is leading (115.8%), followed by Greece (115.1%), Belgium (96.7%), 
Hungary (78.3%), France (77.6%), Portugal (76 8%), Germany (73.2%), Malta 
(69.1%), United Kingdom (68.1%), Austria (66.5%), Ireland (64.0%). It is intriguing 
why, for example, Italy has not been at the front bench of the accused. Moreover, 
Greece is a small economy whereas many other economies with similar debt to GDP 
ratios are far larger and thus constitute a far greater systemic danger. 
What really happened was the result of the interplay of imperialist rivalries 
and a jockeying of stronger imperialisms to pass a part of their burden to weaker ones 
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as well as to less developed economies. Modern capitalism has learned the lessons 
from previous global capitalist crises. Thus, since the onset of the current crisis, it has 
employed all its heavy artillery. Dropping neo-liberal mantras, it has relaxed 
monetary policy and even came up with considerable fiscal packages. It has been 
explained above how the crisis is expressed as a fiscal crisis as well. 
At this point they enter the imperialist rivalries within the EU context. 
Because the current crisis and the fiscal deficits threaten eurozone’s very cohesion, 
the hegemonic European powers actually decided to pass the burden to its more 
backward economies and also to make a significant profit out of interest rate 
extortion. Thus, the deficit and debt problem is being consciously exacerbated in 
order to: 
a. force the reduction of the labour cost (thus making their own activities there 
more profitable); 
b. impose higher interest rates (thus giving their financial institutions, which are 
the main lenders, a hefty bonus); 
c. reduce the amount of money necessary for rescue packages; 
 
Thus, ‘naughty’ countries have to be disciplined. The first act is that suddenly 
it is being discovered that their deficits violate the Maastricht Treaty, something that 
almost everyone in the EU has done the previous years. Then a scare campaign is 
employed preaching that only their deficits are unserviceable and thus their 
economies are in danger of default. This skyrockets the cost of their borrowing, which 
‘accidentally’ comes mainly from banks of the hegemonic countries. Once, this 
process of usurious exploitation is exhausted – as interest rates and CDS become 
exorbitant high – and default an almost self-fulfilled prophecy then the EU together 
with the IMF intervenes to ‘save’ them. 
The EU and the IMF offer the immediately needed funds in order to avoid 
default. In exchange, the ‘saved’ economy relinquishes its sovereignty and comes 
under the iron fist of these organisations that dictate policies and structural reforms in 
detail and check routinely for their implementation. The ‘salvation’ prescription 
follows the pattern of ‘internal devaluation and competitive disinflation’. ‘Internal 
devaluation’ is a contradiction in terms: you cannot devalue a coin in your left pocket 
in relation to the same coin in your right one. But, as it is cynically confessed when 
queried, this term is a mask for radical austerity: since you cannot devalue your 
currency, you must cut your wages and pensions. This is supposed to be followed by 
prices decreases as labour costs fall. This is a cumulative process of successive cycles 
of reduction of wages and prices. Through these reductions, according to mainstream 
economic theory, the country's competitiveness will be strengthened and growth (after 
a significant shrinkage of the economy) will return. This will rectify both deficits and 
create a revamped healthy economy. This policy is accompanied with far reaching 
structural reforms which typically imply a weakening of labour market regulation, 
privatisations, greater opening of the economy etc. This policy has been applied, with 
bigger or smaller variations, to a number of countries from Hungary and Latvia to 
Rumania etc. Ireland was the first Eurozone country that had to succumb to pressures 
and employ the ‘internal devaluation’ prescription. Greece is the second although here 
the political and social situation is much trickier since the Left is much stronger. 
Others are in line for the same trouble. 
The Greek bourgeoisie - via the present PASOK government (and despite the 
latter’s pre-electoral anti-austerity diatribes) - played along this game and tries to turn 
its difficulties into opportunities. It agreed to the derogatory terms of the EU-IMF 
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Memorandum, relinquished economic policy to Brussels and agreed to pay a hefty 
risk premium to foreign lenders. Accordingly, it is pushing for deep pro-capitalist 
structural changes by raising the spectre of default while sniveling that it is being 
obliged to do so by the EU. That is how it pays a premium to the stronger European 
imperialisms while attempting to pass its own burden to the Greek people. 
However, the chosen course is fraught with dangers. Labour is paying heavily 
the cost of restructuring but this alone does not guarantee an exodus from the twin 
crisis. On the contrary, even according with the IMF estimates, managing the public 
deficit will take a couple of years but the external deficit will be out of control for 
many years to come (it is supposed to peak at 150% in 2015). Meanwhile the 
economy is in a downwards spiral with a severe drop of the GDP this year which 
disputes estimates about a recovery in 2012 (and of course government’s utterances of 
an even earlier recovery). Moreover, even in its first steps the policy prescription 
displays serious problems as wages have been ‘internally devalued’ but the price level 
– fuelled by tax increases that have been passed in prices – is increasing instead of 
decreasing. 
But what aggravates problems even further is that, apart from popular 
reactions, sections of Greek capital and the middle classes started being nervous about 
the whole process. For the middle classes, a crucial ally for the stabilization of the 
system after the civil war, the EU-IMF Memorandum policies threatens their very 
existence. The bankruptcy rate of small businesses has increased rapidly, their ability 
to evade taxes – a traditionally and tacitly accepted practice – and thus survive is 
threatened and they face cut-throat competition by big firms. Thus, their unions have 
already voiced their concern and disagreement regarding several aspects of the 
Memorandum policies and reforms. For sections of the Greek capital this process 
carries with it other dangers. First, the imposition of the EU-IMF directorate implies 
that Greek capitalism may face a downgrading in the imperialist pyramid and become 
a lesser class capitalism. Second, the disinflation process is welcomed when it affects 
wages as in this way capital’s profitability is enhanced. However, as soon as this 
process touches assets and when it is coupled with a slump of the economy it leads to 
a fall in the value of Greek firms. Thus, apart from the danger of bankruptcy because 
of the slump they face also the danger of being bought for nearly nothing by foreign 
capitals. This worry has already been voiced by the chairman of the Greek Banking 
Association when he mentioned the danger of ‘de-hellenisation’ (sic!) of the banking 
sector5. 
 
 
V. For a radical alternative 
 
The imposition of the EU-IMF Memorandum leads to the acute deterioration 
in the working and living conditions of the working class. It furthermore, endangers 
the status of the extensive Greek middle classes. The Greek capital, in collusion and 
competition with hegemonic Western capitals, places the entire burden of the crisis on 
their backs. The challenge for capital is greater than what it seems prima facie. If the 
                                                 
5 One of the main internal forces that pushed for the acceptance of the EU-IMF 
Memorandum was the banking sector as it safeguarded its particular interests. It is 
ironic to hear the grievances of those that actually condoned the very ‘de-
hellenisation’ of the rest of the economy (through the further opening to foreign 
capital and the relinquishing of the commanding heights to Brussels). 
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current crisis is the continuation of the structural crisis of 1973-75, then the solution is 
not a simple recovery but above all the invention of a new systemic architecture. Its 
basis cannot be other but the increased and more efficient exploitation of labour. This 
requires dramatic changes in labour relations (particularly regarding the prolongation 
of unpaid labour-time, the flexibility of employment) and a free fall in wages and 
social security. Second, it requires new forms of institutional organization of the 
system and particularly a new role of the bourgeois state in the economy. In all these 
experimentations Greece seems to be a real guinea pig. Ironically, Greek capitalism 
may not come intact out of this process for the reasons analysed above. 
In all cases, Greece and its people are passing difficult times. Its accession to 
the European imperialist integration – the bet placed by the Greek bourgeoisie - has 
become the modern ‘Big Idea’6 that threatens to ruin the country similarly with its 
predecessor. 
But in this tug-of-war, apart from capitals and competing imperialisms, there 
is another crucial factor: the great popular majority of the wage-earners. Insofar as it 
recognises that for it the future is bleak whatever the games of the ruling classes it can 
become a formidable adversary. Then, contrary to the mainstream ‘one-way’, there is 
indeed another way to exit from the crisis. This requires a truly radical change in the 
architecture of the whole economy and society rather than a new stage of capitalism. 
If this system manages to surpass its current crisis it can only do it at the expense of 
the working class. The only other alternative solution is not to strive for some humane 
version of the system but for its substitution. This implies the transition to a socialist 
economy. 
This transition cannot take place in a snap but it is a long and strenuous 
process whose feet are in the current circumstances and its head at its strategic goal. 
This necessitates a programme of measures addressing the immediate problems from 
within the ultimate strategic vision. The most fundamental necessary pre-condition for 
such a programme is the exit from the EU and not simply the EMU. The EU actively 
obstructs the abovementioned transition. Furthermore, in economic terms, it has no 
sense – particularly for a less developed country - to leave the common currency and 
remain constrained by the common market. The exit from the EU and the euro will 
restore to the country economic policy tools that have been relinquished (without the 
people’s awareness and consent) to the transnational EU centres. The devaluation of 
the new currency can be done in ways that would entail much lower cost for workers 
and middle classes than the EU-IMF Memorandum policies. The suspension of debt 
payments, coupled with controls on the movement of capital, will liberate the country 
from the debt burden without endangering the ability to finance its economy. This will 
have to be coupled with the nationalisation of at least the banking sector. Finally, all 
these measures will open possibilities for a restructuring and revival of the productive 
system for the benefit of the popular majority. 
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